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1 Introduction
Although not yet implemented, the Basel II Accord has come under fire by both
academics and politicians. The critique by academics centers on the inability of the
accord to control aggregate risk because it neglects the endogeneity of risk and tends
to have procyclical effects (see, e. g., Dan´ıelsson, Embrechts, Goodhart, Keating,
Muennich, Renault, and Shin (2001)). In contrast, politicians are worried about the
potential consequences of the new accord for the provision of credit, most notably to
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This has even led to an amendment
of the accord, which now has special provisions for loans to SMEs.
Our paper describes a novel channel through which the new capital regulation (Pil-
lar I of the new Basel Accord) may harm especially small banks—and hence their
borrowers, who tend to be small as well— and thereby lead to an increase in aggre-
gate risk. Interestingly, this result does not follow from the implementation of the
internal ratings based (IRB) approach as such, but rather from the banks’ right to
choose between the standardized and the IRB approaches. In fact, in our model,
the introduction of an IRB approach can be beneficial to small banks if it is applied
uniformly to all banks and the fixed costs of implementation are small.
The problem arises from the implicit asymmetric treatment of small and large banks
by the new regulation: The implementation of the IRB approach requires large
initial investments in risk management technologies, which may deter small banks
from choosing the IRB approach. Then only large banks profit from the reduction in
capital requirements (and hence marginal costs) for safe loans in the IRB approach.
This gives them a competitive advantage over small banks. In our model, this may
lead to reduced market shares and higher risk-taking at the small banks, due to
fiercer competition in the market for deposits, and to an increase in aggregate risk
in the economy. If small banks are specialized in extending loans to small firms, the
shrinking market shares of small banks implies a cutback in the lending to these
borrowers, especially to the more creditworthy ones among them.1
There is by now a large literature on the new Basel Accord. Most empirical papers
(too many to be reviewed here) deal with the question whether the accord assigns
the correct risk weights to different risk groups. We will abstract from this issue
here by assuming that the risk weight functions are “correct.” Several papers deal
with the adverse macroeconomic effects of Basel II, especially with its procyclicality
and its neglect of the endogeneity of financial risk (see, e. g., Lowe (2002), Kashyap
and Stein (2004), and Dan´ıelsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2004)). Similar to the authors
of those papers, we are interested in the implications of the new accord for the
aggregate risk in the economy (but in a static setup). A paper by Decamps, Rochet,
1It is now widely accepted that small banks have a competitive advantage in extending rela-
tionship loans based on soft information to opaque borrowers (who tend to be small), whereas
large banks have an advantage in granting loans based on hard information to transparent bor-
rowers. See Berger and Udell (2002) and Stein (2002) for theoretical arguments, and Haynes, Ou,
and Berney (1999), Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2002), Cole, Goldberg, and White
(2004), and Carter and McNulty (2005) for empirical evidence using U. S. data.
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and Roger (2004) is the only one to analyze the interactions among the three pillars
of the new accord. In contrast, we focus on pillar I, the new capital regulation.
The papers most closely related to ours are those by Rime (2003) and Repullo and
Suarez (2004), in which the implications of the co-existence of the standardized and
the IRB approaches for banks’ risk choices are analyzed. Both papers argue that
banks eligible for the IRB approach have a competitive advantage in the provision
of low-risk loans (because the IRB approach has a lower capital requirement), while
the less sophisticated banks have a competitive advantage in the provision of high-
risk loans (because the standardized approach has a lower capital requirement).
This leads to a sorting of borrowers: High risk borrowers tend to be financed by
unsophisticated banks, and low risk borrowers by sophisticated banks.2
Our paper makes a different, and complementary, point by starting from a setup
that differs in several important respects from those used by Rime, and Repullo and
Suarez. First, there are no moral hazard effects in their models. Their results are
entirely driven by the cost differentials from the two regulatory approaches. In our
model, we emphasize moral hazard effects because we believe that one of the main
purposes of capital requirements is to provide incentives for prudent bank behavior.3
Second, the other two papers model bank competition in the loan market, and ignore
competition on the liabilities side. In both models, it is crucial that borrowers are
actually able to switch among banks. In contrast, we model competition on the
liabilities side of banks’ balance sheets, and ignore competition for loans by assuming
that banks serve different clienteles in their loan business. The large empirical
literature contrasting relationship and transactions loans, cited above, points to
a strong segmentation in loan markets: Large banks specialize in different types
of loans than smaller banks. In a context similar to ours, Berger (2004) presents
empirical evidence for limited competition in loan markets among banks that are
likely to adopt the IRB approach and other (smaller) banks. This suggests that it
is appropriate to abstract from loan market competition for the case relevant in our
model, namely the competition among large and small banks. We assume, however,
that large and small banks draw from a similar pool of deposits. Finally, we also
consider the effects of regulation on aggregate risk-taking in the economy.
In order to analyze the effect of the coexistence of the standardized and the IRB
approaches under the new Basel Accord, we need a model of capital regulation as a
reference point. This model has to be sufficiently simple to remain tractable even
in the presence of an asymmetric banking sector, but it should also yield reasonable
predictions of the effects of capital regulation. In a related paper, Repullo (2004)
models the effects of flat and risk-based capital requirements. Our model assump-
tions are similar to those employed by Repullo, but there also are a number of
2Repullo and Suarez (2004) add an interesting quantitative analysis where they simulate the
effects of Basel II on loan rates and quantify the social costs of bank failures needed to justify the
actual IRB capital requirements.
3Most of the existing literature has focussed on moral hazard as the main motivation for capital
requirements. Another prominent explanation is the role of capital as a buffer against losses.
Finally, Morrison and White (2006) argue that capital requirements may help to prevent unsound
banks from taking up operations, thereby solving an adverse selection problem.
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differences: First, Repullo uses a dynamic framework to explicitly model franchise
values. Second, deposits are fully insured in his model; as a result, deposit rates
do not depend on the riskiness of investments. Third, Repullo focuses on symmet-
ric equilibria, whereas we also analyze asymmetric outcomes. Finally, we explicitly
model the disciplining effect of outside equity on inside equity holders; in contrast,
Repullo considers only outside equity and assumes that the interests of the man-
agement and the outside equity holders are aligned. In spite of these differences,
our model yields similar predictions on the effects of flat and risk-based capital re-
quirements: Flat capital requirements can induce banks to invest prudently, but
risk-based capital requirements can achieve the same result at lower capital costs.
Moreover, in both models, risk-taking tends to increase as competition for deposits
intensifies. The main focus of our paper is, however, on the coexistence of flat and
risk-based capital requirements. This adds an interesting twist to the analysis.
Another related paper is by Berger (2004), who empirically assesses the competitive
effects caused by the preferential treatment of SME loans in the IRB approach.
Our theoretical idea could also be applied to this more specific issue because it
also implies a difference in capital requirements (and hence marginal costs) across
different bank groups. Note, however, that our main interest is in the asymmetric
treatment of banks due to the right to choose between the standardized and the IRB
approaches, which may be quantitatively much more important than the “carve-out”
on SME loans. Consistent with our assumption above, Berger concludes that the
competitive effects in the loan market are likely to be small because large and small
banks tend to make different kinds of loans. However, our analysis suggests that
considering the competitive effects on the loan market may not in itself make for a
sufficient assessment of the implications of the special provisions for SME loans.
In the next section, we describe the features of the New Basel Capital Accord that
are relevant for our theoretical model. Section 3 contains the setup of the model. In
Section 4, we analyze a banking sector where all banks are regulated according to the
standardized approach. Section 5 turns to the IRB approach. We first show what
happens when all banks are required to adopt the internal ratings based approach.
Then we analyze the situation where banks can choose between the standardized
and the IRB approaches. Section 6 concludes.
2 The New Basel Capital Accord
Our analysis focuses on one particular—and arguably the most important—aspect
of the new Basel Capital Accord: the enhancement of the risk sensitivity of capital
requirements for credit risk.4 Instead of sorting assets into broad risk categories as
in the 1988 Basel Accord, the new accord envisions that capital requirements de-
pend directly on the debtors’ external or internal ratings. However, the information
requirements are so high that only a subset of banks will be able to reliably provide
4A description of the accord can be found in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004).
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the necessary information. Therefore, the new accord offers banks two distinct op-
tions for calculating capital requirements for credit risk: a standardized approach
and an internal ratings based (IRB) approach.5 Within the IRB approach, banks
can opt for a foundation or an advanced IRB approach, differing with respect to the
extent that internal information is used.
As in the old accord, banks are required to have a capital ratio of at least 8 percent.
The capital ratio is defined as the regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets.
The modifications in the new accord mostly affect the definitions of risk weights in
the denominator of the capital ratio. In the model, we will not distinguish between
regulatory capital and equity. Also, instead of defining risk weights, we will use the
effective capital requirements implied by such weights. For example, a risk weight
of 75 percent translates into an effective capital requirement of 6 percent.
The standardized approach is very similar to the old Basel Accord. Assets are
grouped into different supervisory categories, giving rise to different risk weights.
In contrast to the old accord, the standardized approach recommends the use of
external ratings, if they exist, and specifies different risk weights for different rating
classes; in most other cases, the risk weight is 100 percent. In many countries,
hardly any external ratings exist for a large part of corporate loans, especially to
SMEs; hence, the 100 percent weight applies to them (as it did in the old accord).6
Similarly, no external ratings exist for retail exposures; however, these loans are now
subject to reduced risk weights of only 75 percent. In our model, we will assume that
no external ratings are used under the standardized approach. This is similar to the
simplified standardized approach (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004,
Annex 9)). Also, we will not distinguish between corporate and retail exposures.
Hence, the minimum capital requirement is flat with regard to the riskiness of loans
in our model. Because of the similarity of the standardized approach and the old
regulation, we will treat them as identical.
In the IRB approach, risk weights depend directly on the external and internal as-
sessments of asset risk. Banks estimate risk characteristics, such as the probability
of default, on the basis of their internal data. These estimates then serve as inputs
for the risk weight formulas specified by the Basel Committee. Retail exposures
carry much smaller risk weights than corporate exposures. In our model, we define
different capital requirements for different risk classes of assets, where the require-
ment for safe assets is below the flat requirement in the standardized approach and
the requirement for risky assets is above it. This is in line with the objective of the
Basel Committee to broadly maintain the aggregate level of minimum capital re-
quirements (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004, paragraph 14)). It
is not clear, however, whether this statement refers to the initial portfolio structure,
or to that after portfolio adjustments in reaction to the new accord.
5A similar right to choose existed in the old Basel Accord regarding the treatment of market
risk, where banks can choose between an internal models approach and a standardized method.
6An exception are the United States where many corporate borrowers are rated. However, the
standardized approach is not going to be implemented in the U. S. Instead, the banks (other than
the largest ones) will be allowed to stick to the old Basel Accord.
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Both approaches contain special provisions with respect to SME lending: First, un-
der certain conditions, loans to SMEs can be categorized as retail loans in both
approaches, benefitting from smaller capital requirements. In addition, the IRB
approach allows for a firm-size adjustment for exposures to SMEs. This also re-
duces capital requirements.7 Hence, SME lending is especially favored in the IRB
approach, which reinforces the asymmetric treatment of large and small banks in
the new accord (see Berger (2004) for an empirical analysis of this issue).
Finally, the New Basel Accord contains a long list (51 paragraphs!) of minimum re-
quirements that a bank has to fulfill to be eligible for the IRB approach. Therefore,
the introduction of the IRB approach requires high fixed costs (e. g., for the installa-
tion of a sophisticated risk management system), which may deter smaller and less
sophisticated banks from using the IRB approach. In addition, the lack of sufficient
historical data may make the use of the IRB approach unfeasible for smaller banks.
In neither case would small banks benefit from the decrease in capital requirements
for relatively safe exposures. This paper analyzes how this asymmetric treatment
of large and small banks affects banks’ risk-taking and performance, as well as the
aggregate risk in the economy. Note that our results do not hinge on the specific
modelling details of the regulation. The main effect is driven by the combination of
fixed costs and reduced marginal costs in the new regulation. Our specification is
meant to model these features in the simplest way.8
3 Model Setup
Banks Consider an economy with n+1 chartered banks and without bank entry.
The banks have limited liability and are risk neutral. They are owned by penniless
bankers (the inside equity holders), whose only wealth is the bank charter. They
collect deposits and outside equity, and can invest these funds in one risky project.
There are thus three stakeholders at the bank: depositors, outside equity investors,
and the banker (the inside equity investor).
Each bank can choose from two types of projects. The “safe” project yields y1 with
probability p1 for each invested unit, and zero otherwise. The “risky” project yields
y2 with probability p2, and zero otherwise. Assume that p1 y1 > p2 y2 > 1; then, due
to risk neutrality, an investment in the safe project is efficient. Assume also that
7The illustration in the official documentation suggests that the firm-size adjustment reduces
capital requirements by 20 to 25 percent.
8The exact implementation of the new Basel Accord may differ across jurisdictions. In Europe
and Japan, the new accord will probably be applied to all banks in their jurisdictions. In the
United States, however, the largest banks will be required to switch to the Advanced IRB approach,
whereas all other banks may remain in the old Basel I regulation or switch to the Advanced IRB
approach. Even in such a situation, our main argument remains valid unless the largest banks
would have preferred to stick to Basel I.
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y2 > y1, so that there is scope for the typical risk-shifting problem a` la Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981). The risk-taking of banks cannot be observed by the banks’ investors.9
In the banking sector, there are n small banks (S) and one large bank (L). The large
bank competes with all small banks for deposits, whereas the small banks compete
only with the large bank, but not with other small banks (see the left panel of
Figure 1). This is to capture the idea that small banks operate in isolated local
markets where they compete with large banks maintaining a branch at the same
location, but not with small banks from other locations. This market structure
implies that each local market can be analyzed separately.
In the deposit market, there is imperfect competition a` la Hotelling (1929). Each
small bank is connected with the large bank by a linear road of length 1, where the
small bank is located at position xS of that road, and the large bank at position
xL > xS. Moreover, we assume that 1− xL > xS, which implies that the large bank
has a larger “backyard” than the small bank. Each road is inhabited by a uniformly
distributed mass λ of risk neutral depositors who have a discount factor of one.
Each depositor is endowed with one dollar. As an alternative to bank deposits,
depositors have access to a storage technology. There is no deposit insurance.10
Depositors incur non-monetary transportation costs, which are quadratic in the
distance between the depositor and the bank, i. e., t multiplied by the quadratic
distance. A depositor at position x who chooses the small bank at xS is promised a
nominal repayment of rnomS . If he anticipates that the bank is solvent with probability
pS, his expected payoff is pS r
nom
S − t (x−xS)2 = rS− t (x−xS)2, where rS = pS rnomS
is the expected repayment. Analogously, his expected payoff is rL− t (xL−x)2 if he
chooses the large bank at xL. We assume that transportation costs are so small that
the depositors’ participation constraints are always satisfied. Then the depositor
at position x¯ = xS+xL
2
+ rS−rL
2 t (xL−xS) is just indifferent between the two banks’ offers.
Given identical parameters for all small banks, we can concentrate on symmetric
equilibria in which all small banks choose the same strategy. Then the deposit
volumes of the small banks and the large bank are, respectively,
dS = λ x¯ = λ
(xS + xL)
2
+
λ
2 t (xL − xS)
(
rS − rL
)
and
dL = nλ (1− x¯) = nλ
(
1− xS + xL
2
)
+
nλ
2 t (xL − xS)
(
rL − rS
)
.
Combining terms, we can write
dS = DS/n + σ (rS − rL) and
dL = DL + nσ (rL − rS). (1)
DL and DS/n can be interpreted as the banks’ clienteles. If two competing banks
set identical deposit rates, their deposit supplies are just those of their clienteles;
9Note that the “risky” project has a higher probability of default, but not necessarily a higher
variance. Hence our assumptions do not imply that the projects can be ordered in the mean-
variance-space. The project with the higher mean return may have a higher or lower variance.
10For our purpose, it would be sufficient to assume that deposits are not completely insured.
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these are the banks’ “backyards,” plus one half of the area in-between. Because
the large bank has a larger backyard than the small banks in every market, the
clientele of the large bank is larger than the total clientele of the small banks, i. e.,
DL > DS. The parameter σ measures the substitutability of the banks’ deposits
from the viewpoint of the depositors. If σ is small (i. e., transportation costs and the
distance between banks are large), depositors are reluctant to switch banks, even in
the presence of relatively big differences in expected returns, and banks nearly enjoy
monopolies with respect to their clienteles. If σ is large (i. e., transportation costs
and the distance between banks are small), the deposit market is rather competitive;
depositors are very sensitive to interest rates. The specification implies that the
aggregate supply of deposits is completely inelastic and equal to DL + DS = nλ.
Deposit rates determine only how the aggregate supply is distributed among banks;
they do not affect the aggregate supply. This means that any amount of deposits
gained by one bank must be lost by another.
Banks can also finance their projects through outside equity, kj. Equity is provided
by investors, who demand an exogenously given expected return of rk, which can be
interpreted as the opportunity cost of equity investors. Raising equity is “expensive,”
i. e., rk > p1 y1, and it therefore dilutes the value of a bank’s inside equity.
11 Hence,
equity finance would be inefficient in the absence of a moral hazard problem, but it
can be used for mitigating the risk-shifting problem. We assume that depositors do
not have access to the market for equity; this allows us to ignore the optimization
problem of investors who can choose between holding deposits or bank equity.12 We
implicitly assume that the management holds some shares (inside equity) in the
bank. This assumption is not crucial. What we need is that the management has
some interest in their bank’s profits (this could also be through stock option plans
or other performance-based compensation schemes).
Capital Adequacy We analyze two different regulatory approaches.
1. The standardized approach does not distinguish between projects with different
risk levels. A fraction of at least α of a bank’s assets must be financed by equity.
Hence, a bank’s balance sheet must satisfy the regulatory constraint
kj ≥ α (dj + kj),
where dj + kj is the amount invested in risky assets.
2. The internal ratings based (IRB) approach distinguishes between different risk
classes. The regulatory constraint is
kj ≥ β1 (dj + kj) (2)
11This assumption has become standard in the literature (see, e. g., Hellmann, Murdoch, and
Stiglitz (2000) and Repullo (2004)). The classical justification for the dilution cost is a lemons
problem, as in Myers and Majluf (1984) or Rock (1986).
12The dilution cost of outside equity can also be derived from general equilibrium considerations;
see, for example, Gorton and Winton (2000) and Hellmann, Murdoch, and Stiglitz (2000).
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Figure 1: Competitive Structure and Timeline
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• Banks choose regulatory approaches.
• Banks announce deposit rates rj and collect
deposits dj. Depositors anticipate banks’ risk
choices.
• Banks sell shares to get equity kj. Share-
holders anticipate banks’ risk choices.
• Banks choose projects and invest.
• Projects mature. If the projects are success-
ful, banks repay debt and equity; otherwise,
they default and repay nothing.
The left panel illustrates the competitive structure in the banking sector; L refers to the large
bank, S to the small banks. The right panel shows the timeline of our model.
if the bank chooses the safe project, and
kj ≥ β2 (dj + kj) (3)
if the bank chooses the risky project, where β2 > α > β1. Finally, the IRB
approach requires a sophisticated internal risk management, entailing a non-
monetary fixed cost of C.
The above specification implicitly assumes that the regulator has some enforcement
mechanism to make the banks comply with the regulation and truthfully report
their risk-taking. Why, then, does the regulator not prohibit banks from taking
risky projects? One possible explanation is that, in reality, risky projects are not
necessarily inefficient; all that regulators want to prohibit is excessive risk-taking.
Banks may be better than regulators in choosing the optimal risk-return ratio of
their projects. Therefore, regulators should not ban risky projects completely, but
instead put a disincentive on risk-taking, as has been described by Rochet (1992).
The assumption of truthful reporting also underlies the Basel II regulation in reality.
The fact that we do not observe a prohibition of risky projects suggests that the
observed combination of regulatory rules, supervision, and disclosure are believed
to be superior. An explicit model of this complicated dynamic interaction between
banks and regulators is beyond the scope of this paper.
The right panel of Figure 1 displays the time structure of the model. We do not
consider the stage where the regulator sets the regulatory parameters α, β1, and β2;
these are taken as given by earlier regulatory decisions. Furthermore, we assume
that banks collect deposits before equity.13 This implies that banks cannot use their
equity to signal project quality to depositors. If they could, there would be no
need for regulation because banks would voluntarily choose a sufficient amount of
13Technically, this is similar to assuming that depositors are unable to observe their bank’s
equity; see Morrison and White (2006).
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equity.14 We will now characterize the equilibria of the model under different types
of capital regulation.
4 The Standardized Approach
In this section, we assume that all banks must adopt the standardized approach.
4.1 Risk Choices of Banks
We determine the equilibrium by using backward induction. First, we study the
banks’ risk choices for given deposit volumes, deposit rates, and capital structures.
Then we analyze the banks’ behavior in the equity market, and finally (in Sec-
tion 4.2) their behavior in the deposit market.
In this model, there is a simple decision rule concerning banks’ project choices. A
bank will choose the risky project if and only if expected returns on deposits exceed
a critical deposit rate, rcrit. If a bank j collects dj units of deposits and kj units
of equity, it can invest dj + kj in risky assets. The index j will be omitted when
there is no danger of confusion. Since equity cannot be used as a signal, regulatory
constraints will always bind, α = k/(d + k) and 1− α = d/(d + k).
If the bank chooses the safe project, its expected project returns are p1 y1 (d + k).
The expected debt service is r d, hence profits after debt service are p1 y1 (d+k)−r d.
Assume that a fraction δ of profits is paid to outside equity investors; the banker
receives the remaining profits, (1− δ) (p1 y1 (d + k)− r d). If the depositors expect
the bank to choose the safe project, the profits accruing to the banker are
Π1 = (1− δ) p1 (y1 (d + k)− r d/p1), (4)
given that the bank chooses the safe project as anticipated by the depositors. If,
however, depositors anticipate that the bank will choose the safe project and it opts
for the risky project, expected profits are
Π2 = (1− δ) p2 (y2 (d + k)− r d/p1).
The critical expected return that equalizes Π1 and Π2 is
rcrit =
d + k
d
p1
p1 y1 − p2 y2
p1 − p2 =
p1
p1 − p2
p1 y1 − p2 y2
1− α . (5)
14Our time structure captures the idea that, due to changing costs, depositors are “stuck” with
their bank once they have deposited their funds there. If depositors could withdraw their funds
without costs after observing the bank’s equity (and inferring the bank’s project choice), and
deposit at another bank, they could punish their bank for misbehavior. We exclude this type of
disciplining device.
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Now look at the equity investors’ decision problem. If the shareholders anticipate
that the bank will take the safe project, the expected payment to them amounts to
δ (p1 y1 (d + k) − r d). This must at least equal rk k, otherwise equity investors do
not participate. In equilibrium, the term will be equal to rk k. Solving this equation
for δ and substituting into (4), we get
Π1 = (d + k) p1 y1 − r d− k rk.
Considering further that k = dα/(1− α) implies
Π1 = d
(p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
)
.
Following the same procedure for the risky project, and combining the two profit
functions, we get expected profits of
Π = d
(pi yi − α rk
1− α − r
)
, (6)
with i = 1 (safe project) for r ≤ rcrit and i = 2 (risky project) for r > rcrit.
Capital adequacy has two effects on the profitability of banks. First, for a given
project choice, it deteriorates profitability, because the bank is forced to refinance
itself through expensive equity. In general, part (but not necessarily all) of this cost
is going to be shifted to depositors in the form of reduced deposit rates. Second, a
higher α increases the critical deposit rate rcrit. If this induces a bank to take the
efficient project where it otherwise would have chosen the inefficient one, profitability
is enhanced. Then the capital regulation is beneficial for the bank because it allows
the bank to commit to the safe project and thus to avoid higher refinancing costs.
Our model of capital requirements differs from most of the existing literature in
that it explicitly models the disciplining effect of outside equity for inside equity
holders.15 Issuing outside capital enables the bank to commit to choosing the safe
project because it dilutes the bank’s share in the risky project’s repayment in case of
success. Most of the literature considers either banks with owner-managers without
any outside equity (examples are Repullo and Suarez (2004) and Morrison and
White (2006)), or banks with only outside equity, where the managers are assumed
to maximize the bank’s profits (as in Hellmann, Murdoch, and Stiglitz (2000) and
Repullo (2004)). The modelling approach closest to ours is by Acharya (2003).
4.2 Reaction Functions of Banks
After having discussed the banks’ risk choices and the shareholders’ investment
decisions, let us finally come to the banks’ behavior in the deposit market. We start
with the analysis of a single bank (without loss of generality, the large bank) in a
specific local market. If competition is weak and deposit rates are low, moral hazard
15We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this point.
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is not a problem, and the large bank will choose the safe project. We will establish
constraints on σ afterwards. Substituting (1) into (6) yields
Π1L =
(
DL + nσ (rL − rS)
) (p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − rL
)
.
The first-order condition implies
rL =
1
2
(p1 y1 − α rk
1− α + rS −
DL
nσ
)
. (7)
The bank’s expected profits are
Π1L =
nσ
4
(p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − rS +
DL
nσ
)2
,
and its deposit volume is
dL =
nσ
2
p1 y1 − α rk
1− α +
DL − nσ rS
2
.
When the competitor’s rate rS rises, the bank reacts by also offering higher rates
(see (7)). At some point rkinkS , it reaches the critical rate with rL = r
crit,
rkinkS = 2 r
crit +
DL
nσ
− p1 y1 − α rk
1− α .
When rS rises further, the bank does not immediately offer higher deposit rates, but
it continues to offer rcrit (hence the kinks in Figure 2). Otherwise, depositors would
anticipate that the bank will choose the risky project and demand a higher default
premium. The bank’s deposit volume is now dL = DL + nσ (r
crit − rS).
However, at some point rjumpS , market rates are so high that the bank prefers to raise
its rate, thereby admitting that it will take the risky project, but “regaining” some
volume. After this point, the bank sets a deposit rate of
rL =
1
2
(p2 y2 − α rk
1− α + rS −
DL
nσ
)
.
The nominal rate is then rL/p2. The regime switch occurs when expected profits of
the bank are equal in both regimes,
(
DL + nσ (r
crit − rS)
) (p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
)
=
nσ
4
(p2 y2 − α rk
1− α − rS +
DL
nσ
)2
.
Such an increase in expected deposit rates is profitable for the bank, even though
it reduces its margin (through the reduction in expected project returns and the
increase in deposit rates). The reason is the accompanying gain in market share,
which compensates for the lower profit margin. Hence, at the critical rjumpS , the
deposit volume of the bank jumps up.
Summing up, the large bank’s reaction function is
rL =


1
2
(p1 y1 − α rk
1− α + rS −
DL
nσ
)
: rS ≤ rkinkS ,
rcrit : rkinkS < rS ≤ rjumpS ,
1
2
(p2 y2 − α rk
1− α + rS −
DL
nσ
)
: rjumpS < rS.
The reaction functions of the small banks have an analogous form. Figure 2 depicts
the reaction functions of both bank types for a numerical example.
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Figure 2: Reaction Functions
rcrit
rcrit
rS
rL
rkinkS r
jump
S
rkinkL
rjumpL
Here and in the following figures, the parameters are y1 = 2, p1 = 2/3, y2 = 3.5, p2 = 1/3,
α = 1/10, rk = 3/2. Furthermore, t = 20/9, xS = 1/4, xL = 11/20, and λ = 1, implying that
DL = 3/5, DS = 2/5, and σ = 3/4. The thick curve is the reaction function of the large bank, the
thin curve is that of small banks.
4.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium lies at the intersection of the reaction functions. Given the geo-
metric structure of those functions, there is at least one equilibrium. However, the
intersection may not be unique. For example, all banks may take the safe project
(with deposit rates below the jump) in one equilibrium, whereas they may all take
the risky project (with deposit rates above the jump) in another equilibrium. In
such cases, we pick the Pareto-superior equilibrium with the lower deposit rates.16
Banks’ behavior can be characterized by a number of regimes, differing with respect
to the banks’ risk-taking and deposit rates. The regime in which the banks find
themselves depends on the intensity of competition. In our discussion, we start
from a regime with low competition (small σ), and then consider what happens
if σ is increased. Figure 3 illustrates the effects of competition on banks’ deposit
rates, volumes, profits, and on welfare. We first discuss banks’ deposit rates and
risk-taking, before turning to banks’ profits and to welfare.
Regime 1: All banks below the kink When both types of banks are below
the kink, moral hazard is not a problem, and all banks choose the safe project.
Equilibrium deposit rates are
rL =
p1 y1 − α rk
1− α −
DL
nσ
+
DL −DS
3nσ
,
rS =
p1 y1 − α rk
1− α −
DS
nσ
− DL −DS
3nσ
. (8)
16Comparative statics would be unchanged if we always picked the inferior equilibrium.
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Small banks offer higher deposit rates than the large bank. Because they have a
smaller clientele, raising deposit rates is less costly for them, hence they act more
aggressively (rS > rL) in order to attract a larger market share. When competition
increases (σ rises), both types of banks increase their deposit rates. As equilibrium
deposit volumes, we obtain
dL = DL − DL −DS
3
,
dS = DS +
DL −DS
3n
,
hence volumes do not depend on competition σ. Expected profits are
ΠL =
1
9nσ
(
2DL + DS
)2
and ΠS =
1
9nσ
(
2DS + DL
)2
.
Regime 2: Small banks above the kink At some point, the small banks, offer-
ing the higher rate, are going to reach the critical rate rcrit. They know that if they
raised deposit rates further, depositors would anticipate that the bank will choose
the inefficient project, and demand an additional default premium. Therefore, small
banks optimally leave their rates unchanged, foregoing some market share. This
weakens competition for the large bank, which now sets a lower rate than it would
in the absence of the moral hazard problem. However, as long as its deposit rate is
below rcrit, the large bank increases its deposit rate as σ rises, albeit not as strongly
as before. Formally, deposit rates are given by
rL =
1
2
(p1 y1 − α rk
1− α + r
crit − DL
nσ
)
,
rS = r
crit,
and deposit volumes by
dL =
DL
2
+
nσ
2
(
p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
)
,
dS =
DL + 2DS
2n
− σ
2
(
p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
)
.
Now the large bank grows with increasing competition, while the small banks shrink.
Regime 3: All banks above the kink For higher competition, the large bank
also reaches the critical rate rcrit.17 Then both types of banks offer the same rate
rL = rS = r
crit.
17If small and large banks are sufficiently asymmetric (DL  DS), or if the moral hazard problem
is small (p1 y1 ≈ p2 y2), it may happen that the small banks reach rjump before the large bank
reaches rcrit. This would give rise to an additional regime. We do not explicitly treat this regime
in the paper because it does not provide any additional insights, but just makes the discussion
more cumbersome.
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The nominal rate is also identical because all banks take the safe project. Hence no
bank can attract any customers from another bank, and deposit volumes are equal
to the respective clienteles,
dL = DL and dS = DS.
Regime 4: Small banks above the jump At some point, it becomes profitable
for the banks to raise their deposit rates. The higher the competition, the easier it
is to steal each others’ customers; poaching becomes more attractive. Due to their
smaller clienteles, the small banks will be the first to raise their deposit rates above
the critical rate. However, they now have to accept higher (nominal) refinancing
costs because depositors anticipate that small banks will take the risky project. In
order to attract part of the large bank’s customers, small banks will increase their
deposit rates by so much that even the expected deposit rates will jump up. The
large bank will stick to the lower deposit rate, accepting a decrease in its market
share. Equilibrium rates are
rL = r
crit,
rS =
1
2
(p2 y2 − α rk
1− α + r
crit − DS
nσ
)
, (9)
yielding the deposit volumes
dL =
2DL + DS
2
− nσ
2
(
p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
)
,
dS =
DS
2n
+
σ
2
(
p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
)
.
The increase in small banks’ deposit rates may be so large that the large bank
also finds it beneficial to raise its rate. Then regime 3 may directly be followed by
regime 5 (see Figure 4 for an illustration).
Regime 5: All banks above the jump Finally, even the large bank finds it
profitable to raise deposit rates sharply and signal that it will take the risky project.
From this point on, all banks take the risky project. The small banks react by
raising deposit rates as well, but not as sharply as the large bank. Therefore, the
small banks will lose some of the market share they had gained before. However,
the small banks’ rate will continue to exceed the rate at the large bank.
Similar to (8), we obtain
rL =
p2 y2 − α rk
1− α −
DL
nσ
+
DL −DS
3nσ
,
rS =
p2 y2 − α rk
1− α −
DS
nσ
− DL −DS
3nσ
.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Deposit Rates, Volumes, Profits, and Welfare
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Thick lines denote the large bank, thin lines the small banks. For deposits and profits, aggregate
amounts for the group of small banks are plotted. Numbers on the abscissa indicate regimes.
The expressions for deposit volumes and profits are the same as in regime 1; yet,
profits are much lower due to higher competition and, hence, higher deposit rates.
We now discuss how banks’ profits are affected by the different regimes (see the
bottom left panel of Figure 3). In general, increasing competition decreases profits.
The reason is that banks have to offer higher interest rates to prevent their depositors
from switching to another bank. Thereby they exert a negative externality on their
competitors. In our model, this externality is very strong because of the inelastic
aggregate supply of deposits; the qualitative result would still hold if the supply
of deposits was elastic (but not perfectly elastic). However, in some regimes, the
moral hazard problem prevents some banks from raising rates, which implies a drop
in their market shares and profits if the competitor bank continues to raise rates.
For example, in regime 4, the large bank does not offer higher rates, whereas small
banks raise rates in response to higher competition. Even though this reduces small
banks’ margins, it may boost their profits due to the gains in market shares. Hence,
in regime 4, small banks may actually profit from an increase in competition (or,
more precisely, substitutability) because it makes it easier to attract the large bank’s
depositors (see Figure 3 for an example of this phenomenon). The large bank’s
deposit rate is a suboptimal response to the rate of the competitor bank, and the
bank’s profits decrease. If both large and small banks are unwilling to raise rates
(regime 3), an increase in σ leaves volumes, rates and profits unaffected.
Finally, we analyze the effects of competition on welfare (see the bottom right panel
of Figure 3). In our model, welfare consists of three components: the proceeds from
the project, the opportunity costs of equity finance, and the depositors’ transporta-
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tion costs. The opportunity costs of depositors do not have to be taken into account
because they are constant, given that the aggregate deposit volume is constant.
Interest and dividend payments are welfare-neutral. Hence, the welfare function is
W =
∑
j
[
(pj yj) dj − (rk − pj yj) kj
]− transportation costs
=
∑
j
dj
pj yj − α rk
1− α − transportation costs.
The aggregate opportunity costs from equity finance (i. e., nλ rk α/(1− α)) do not
depend on σ. Hence, competition affects welfare through two factors: the banks’
project choices and transportation costs. In regimes 1 to 3, all banks choose the
safe project, hence the first welfare component is relatively high and constant across
these regimes. In regime 4, small banks take the risky project and expand, leading
to an increasing welfare loss. Finally in regime 5, both types of banks take the risky
project. This has a further negative impact on welfare. This negative dependence of
welfare on competition is similar to the prediction of the literature on the trade-off
between banking stability and competition. Regarding the second welfare compo-
nent, there are two effects: First, welfare decreases if deposit rates become asymmet-
ric because this increases transportation costs. Second, transportation costs affect
welfare directly; a higher σ corresponds to lower transportation costs, and hence
higher welfare. The first effect implies that welfare is relatively high in regime 3,
where all banks serve their own clienteles (which minimizes transportation costs).
The second effect implies that welfare tends to increase in σ. Taken together, these
considerations imply that, if transportation costs are not too large, welfare as a
function of α reaches a global optimum at the border between regimes 3 and 4.
The exact form of the welfare function depends on the relative significance of the
difference in the projects’ expected returns and the size of transportation costs.
Figure 3 presents an example of the complicated form that this function may have.
Finally, due to our assumption of a completely inelastic deposit supply, there is no
deadweight loss from imperfect competition. With an elastic deposit supply, higher
competition would decrease the deadweight loss and hence increase welfare.
4.4 The Impact of Capital Regulation
So far, we have been holding capital regulation constant. Now we ask how the
banks respond to a tightening of capital requirements. We first consider what hap-
pens within the regimes described in the preceding section. Then we discuss regime
switches triggered by tightened regulation. In general, an increase in capital require-
ments has two effects: First, it reduces the profitability of banking due to higher
capital costs; this tends to lower deposit rates. Second, it raises the critical interest
rates and thereby relaxes the constraints on deposit rates in regimes 2, 3, and 4;
this tends to increase deposit rates. Table 1 summarizes the qualitative results for
all regimes. The algebra is straightforward, and is therefore omitted.
In regimes 1 and 5, only the first effect is present. Higher capital requirements
reduce the profitability of banking. This makes banks less aggressive in the deposit
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Table 1: Comparative Statics Within Regimes for Changes in Capital Requirements
Regime 1 2 3 4 5
∂rL/∂α − +/− + + −
∂dL/∂α 0 − 0 + 0
∂ΠL/∂α 0 − − +/− 0
∂rS/∂α − + + +/− −
∂dS/∂α 0 + 0 − 0
∂ΠS/∂α 0 +/− − − 0
The table entries give the signs of the partial derivatives. +/− means that the sign is ambiguous.
market and reduces deposit rates for all banks. Since small and large banks lower
their rates by the same amount, deposit volumes remain unchanged. The lower
refinancing costs due to lower deposit rates completely offset the deterioration in
profitability due to higher capital costs. The increase in the capital costs is shifted
entirely to the depositors, and banks’ profits remain unchanged.18
In regime 2, only small banks are constrained by the critical rate rcrit. As capital
requirements are tightened, the critical rate rises, which allows the small banks to
raise their deposit rates to the new rcrit and expand. The small banks’ profits may
even increase, in spite of higher capital costs. Given the inelastic aggregate supply
of deposits, the large bank must shrink. The effect on the large bank’s deposit rate
is ambiguous. On the one hand, the rate increase by the small banks induces the
large bank to raise its rate as well. On the other hand, the investment becomes
less profitable due to higher equity costs; this reduces competition for deposits and
induces the large bank to decrease its rate. In any case, the large bank’s profits fall.
In regime 3, both types of banks are above the kink, but below the jump. Tight-
ened regulation relaxes the constraints on deposit rates for large and small banks.
However, because both types of banks raise their deposit rates, volumes remain
unchanged, and profits of all banks decrease. The result on volumes is driven by
our assumption that deposits are constant at the aggregate level. If we relaxed this
assumption, volumes would increase in the presence of tightened regulation.19 Then
a tightening of regulation might even have an expansionary effect on the banking
sector because it attenuates the moral hazard problem.
Finally, in regime 4, small banks prefer to take the risky project. The effects of
tightened capital regulation are the same as in regime 2, with reversed roles. Now
only the large bank is constrained by the critical rate rcrit. When this constraint is
relaxed, the large bank can raise its rate and expand at the expense of small banks.
Small banks may raise or lower their rates, and will shrink unambiguously. The
large bank may increase its profits, whereas the small banks will always lose.
18This result is typical for models of spatial competition, like those by Hotelling (1929) or Salop
(1979). It is driven by the inelastic deposit supply.
19However, profits may decrease even in the presence of an elastic aggregate supply of deposits.
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Figure 4: Regimes for Varying α and σ, standardized approach
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The numbers mark the areas of the different regimes as described in the text. The dotted horizontal
line refers to α = 0.1, the example used in the previous figures. The dashed line marks α¯ =
p1 p2 (y2 − y1)/(p1 − p2)/rk (here α¯ = 2/3), above which only regime 1 exists.
The preceding discussion suggests that a tightening of capital requirements may
lead to an expansion of one type of bank in certain cases. Of particular interest is
regime 2, where small banks may expand in the face of tightened regulation. If one
assumes that small banks are specialized in financing small and medium enterprises
(SMEs), this result implies that the financing of SMEs is not necessarily choked by
capital adequacy. In fact, the opposite may be true.
In our model, a tightening of capital regulation in most cases reduces welfare in the
absence of regime switches. The reason is that higher capital adequacy increases
the inefficiencies arising from equity finance, while leaving the aggregate level of
deposits unchanged.20 If the aggregate supply of deposits were very elastic, welfare
increases would be conceivable in all regimes, even without regime switches. More
importantly, welfare increases can be obtained if the tightening of regulation induces
a switch to a regime with lower risk-taking. Figure 4 illustrates such regime switches
for a numerical example: Starting from a regime where one or both types of banks
opt for the risky project (regimes 4 or 5), an increase in α eventually leads to a
switch into a regime where both types of banks opt for the safe project (holding
competition σ constant). The following proposition formalizes this result.21
Proposition 1 (Standardized Approach) Higher capital requirements increase
the critical levels of competition σcritS and σ
crit
L , above which small and large banks
choose the risky project, i. e., ∂σcritS /∂α > 0 and ∂σ
crit
L /∂α > 0.
Graphically, the proposition implies that the border between the area where all
banks choose the safe project (regimes 1, 2, and 3) and the remaining area (regimes 4
20In some regimes, the capital regulation also has an effect on transportation costs because it
increases (regime 2) or decreases (regime 4) the deposit rate differentials. In the latter case, the
overall effect of the regulation on welfare may even be positive.
21The proofs of propositions and remarks are found in the Appendix.
Bank Size and Risk-Taking under Basel II 19
and 5), and the border between regimes 4 and 5 are strictly increasing (see Figure 4).
In fact, this is true for all borders. Economically, the proposition implies that
switching to the risky project becomes less attractive when capital requirements
are higher. When competition increases, banks have an incentive to increase their
rates to capture some market share from their competitor. However, the increase in
deposit rates is bounded above by the return that banks earn from their projects. If,
in regime 3, rcrit increases due to tighter regulation, the implied increase in deposit
rates limits the scope for further rate increases. Hence, offering higher rates (and
switching to the risky project) becomes less attractive for small banks. An analogous
argument applies to the large bank at the border between regimes 4 and 5.
Proposition 1 implies that higher capital requirements reduce the range of σ, for
which at least one type of bank opts for the risky project (regimes 4 and 5). Ac-
cording to the following remark, this statement can be generalized to any other
parameter of our model: For any parameter of our model, the range of regimes 4
and 5 shrinks in reaction to an increase in α.
Remark 1 Higher capital requirements weakly reduce the set of parameters for
which at least one type of bank chooses the risky project.
We can conclude that, in our model, a suitably designed capital regulation can
increase welfare because it may induce banks to switch from the risky to the safe
project. An optimal regulation would try to deter banks from choosing inefficient
risks, while minimizing the costs of equity finance. If the costs of equity are not
prohibitively high, this would be achieved at the border between regimes 3 and 4.
5 The IRB Approach
So far, we have discussed an economy in which all banks use the standardized
approach. Now we turn to the IRB approach. We first assume that all banks must
adopt the IRB approach (Section 5.1). Then we analyze the banks’ right to choose
between the two approaches, envisioned by the new Basel Accord (Section 5.2).
5.1 Compulsory IRB Approach
In this section, we assume that the IRB approach according to (2) and (3) is com-
pulsory for all banks. What are the implications of switching from the standardized
to the IRB approach? Clearly, the answer depends on whether the regulation has
become stricter or looser. We assumed above that banks need less capital if they
choose the safe project, compared to the standardized approach, and more capital
if they choose the risky project, i. e., β1 < α < β2. Our qualitative results are
independent of how much β1 lies below α, and β2 above it.
Bank Size and Risk-Taking under Basel II 20
Using the same procedure as in Section 4.1, we derive the critical rate r˙crit. For
distinction, we put a dot on variables that refer to the compulsory IRB approach.
Let Π1 again denote the expected profits of a bank that chooses the safe project as
anticipated by the depositors, and Π2 the profits of a bank that deviates by taking
the risky project. We then get
Π1 = (1− δ1) p1 (y1 (d + k1)− r d/p1)− C, with
k1 = δ1 p1 (y1 (d + k1)− r d/p1)/rk
if the bank takes the safe project, and
Π2 = (1− δ2) p2 (y2 (d + k2)− r d/p1)− C, with
k2 = δ2 p2 (y2 (d + k2)− r d/p1)/rk
if the bank deviates, yielding
Π1 = d
(
p1 y1 − β1 rk
1− β1 − r
)
− C, and
Π2 = d
(
p2 y2 − β2 rk
1− β2 −
p2
p1
r
)
− C.
The critical deposit rate is then
r˙crit =
p1
p1 − p2
(
p1 y1 − rk
1− β1 −
p2 y2 − rk
1− β2
)
.
One can check that, for β1 = β2 = α, the critical rate is the same as in the standard-
ized approach (see (5)). Comparative statics are ∂r˙crit/∂β1 < 0 and ∂r˙
crit/∂β2 > 0.
Raising β1, while holding β2 constant, lowers the relative costs of risk-shifting; rais-
ing β2, while holding β1 constant, increases them. Given our assumptions on β1
and β2, r˙
crit is strictly larger than rcrit.22 In contrast to the standardized approach,
the critical rate also depends on the cost of equity rk, with ∂r˙
crit/∂rk > 0. Higher
capital costs make risk-shifting less attractive because they raise the costs of the
risky project relative to those of the safe project. This implies that, under the IRB
approach, an increase in the costs of capital has a similar effect as a tightening of
regulation. Hence, higher costs of capital allow the regulator to loosen regulation
without inducing risk-shifting. This was not true under the standardized approach.
Fixed costs C are irrelevant for the marginal analysis and for risk-shifting.
The introduction of the IRB approach has two effects: First, it decreases the capital
requirements for the safe project and increases them for the risky project. The effects
are similar to those deriving from a loosened or tightened capital regulation in the
standardized approach. Second, it raises the critical rate. The qualitative properties
22The fact that r˙crit lies above (and possibly well above) rcrit is crucial for the model when
we introduce the right to choose between different regulatory approaches. If, for example, banks’
deposit rates are constrained by rcrit (as in regime 3), they have an incentive to implement the
IRB approach in order to overcome this constraint and raise rates, but not farther than r˙crit.
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of banks’ reaction functions are the same as under the standardized approach (see
Figure 2). As a result, we again have five regimes, depending on whether banks are
below or above the kinks and the jumps of their reaction functions.
We start again by describing the behavior of banks within regimes, before discussing
regime switches. If both types of banks are below the kink (regime 1), they will
offer higher deposit rates. Lower capital requirements make the investment more
profitable, hence the competition for deposits becomes more severe. The opposite
is true when all banks are above the jump (regime 5). Here, because both types of
bank take the risky project, capital adequacy is tightened, and deposit rates drop.
In regime 2, all banks raise their rates. Small banks raise their rates because the
increase in the critical rate (from rcrit to r˙crit) relaxes the constraints on their deposit
rate policies. The large bank raises its rate because the small banks raise their rates,
and because investing becomes more profitable. However, the rate increase at the
large bank is less pronounced than at the small banks. This allows the small banks to
“recapture” some market share from the large bank. Remarkably, this may even lead
to increased profits at the small banks. As a result, small banks may benefit from a
transition from the standardized to the compulsory IRB approach. In contrast, the
large bank shrinks, and its profits are always decreased compared to the standardized
approach. These results are interesting because they contradict the frequently made
assertion that small borrowers are bound to suffer from the IRB approach. We see
that, under the compulsory IRB approach, small banks may actually gain relative to
the large bank. If small banks primarily serve small borrowers, our results suggest
that the IRB approach may actually have an expansionary effect on SME borrowing.
In regime 3, all banks raise rates after the transition to the IRB approach because
of the increase in the critical rate. This results in lower profits for both bank types.
Finally, in regime 4, the large bank raises its rate because of the increase in the
critical rate. The reaction of small banks is ambiguous. On the one hand, they
want to raise rates in reaction to the large bank’s rate increase. On the other hand,
they want to cut rates because they are subject to a stricter capital requirement,
rendering investment less attractive.
As before, we are interested most in whether the transition from the standardized
to the IRB approach can deter banks from choosing the risky project. Figure 5
presents a numerical example. The left panel shows equilibrium deposit rates in the
IRB approach for different levels of competition, as well as the levels of competition
at which regime switches occur in the standardized approach. Apparently, all regime
switches move towards higher competition. In the right panel, the critical σ’s of the
regime switches are plotted for varying ∆β = β2−β1, measuring the degree of differ-
entiation in the IRB approach. The thick curve denotes the critical σ, above which
at least one bank type chooses the risky project. The curve increases monotonically.
Similarly, the border between regimes 4 and 5 increases monotonically. Hence, the
more the IRB approach differentiates among risks, the more competitive markets
must be to induce banks to choose the risky project. The following proposition
states that these results are true for any parameter constellation. As before, the
other borders increase as well. The proofs are analogous.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium Deposit Rates and Regime Switches, IRB approach
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In the left panel, the thick line denotes the large bank, the thin line the small banks. Dotted
lines correspond to the standardized approach, dashed lines to the IRB approach. In the figure,
β1 = 1/20 and β2 = 3/20. The right panel plots the critical σ’s of the different regimes for varying
∆β = β2 − β1. The dotted horizontal line refers to the parameters of the left panel, ∆β = 1/10.
Proposition 2 (Compulsory IRB approach) A transition from the standard-
ized to a compulsory IRB approach increases the critical levels of competition σcritS
and σcritL , above which small and large banks choose the risky project,
i. e., ∂σcritS /∂∆β > 0 and ∂σ
crit
L /∂∆β > 0.
Because switching to the risky project is more costly than under the standardized
approach, both types will start to raise rates (and signal that they will take the
risky project) at a more competitive stage. Similar to Remark 1, the transition
from the standardized to a compulsory IRB approach weakly reduces the set of
(any) parameters for which at least one type of bank takes the risky project.
Let us discuss the effects of the transition on welfare. Within the regimes, the IRB
approach reduces the inefficiencies from capital finance relative to the standardized
approach if banks choose the safe project (regimes 1 to 3). The opposite is true when
both banks take the risky project (regime 5). In regime 4, the effect is ambiguous
because capital requirements increase for one bank, but decrease for the other.23
More importantly, welfare may be increased relative to the standardized approach
because the IRB approach is better than the standardized approach at deterring
banks from choosing the risky project. However, banks have to incur fixed costs C
under the IRB approach, which reduces welfare. In fact, these fixed costs may be
so high that some banks are driven out of business. In our model, this may increase
or decrease welfare, depending on the size of fixed costs and transportation costs.
An optimal compulsory IRB regulation would try to induce all banks to opt for the
safe project and save on capital costs. Hence, within our model with two projects,
the regulator optimally chooses a corner solution: He sets β1 = 0 and β2 = 1, so
that risk-taking becomes prohibitively expensive, and capital costs are reduced to
zero. Therefore, if fixed costs are not too high, the IRB approach is superior to the
23Again there are additional welfare effects due to changing interest differentials, which are
clearly negative in regime 2 and ambiguous in regime 4.
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standardized approach in terms of welfare because it economizes on capital. Hence,
we can conclude that the compulsory transition from the standardized to the IRB
approach achieves its goal as long as the fixed costs C are not too high.
5.2 The Right to Choose
In the preceding section, we assumed that all banks have to adopt the IRB approach.
However, the new Basel Accord does not make such a prescription. Instead it allows
banks to choose between the standardized and the IRB approaches. This right to
choose fundamentally changes our assessment of the regulation.
Banks will opt for the IRB approach if this increases their profits, given the regu-
latory approaches and deposit rates of their competitor banks. If fixed costs C are
so high that neither small nor large banks choose the IRB approach, we end up in
the situation discussed in Section 4. If fixed costs C are so low that all bank types
opt for the IRB approach, we end up in the situation discussed in Section 5.1. The
interesting case is the intermediate situation where switching to the IRB approach
is profitable only for the large bank.24
Since small banks retain the standardized approach, their capital requirement is α.
For the large bank, the requirement is reduced to β1 because the large bank never
chooses the risky project. If it did, regulation would become stricter because of
the IRB approach; hence the investment C could not be profitable. As a result,
competition must be relatively low. Furthermore, the IRB approach will allow the
large bank to offer higher deposit rates. If the large bank has not yet reached
the critical deposit rate, it will raise rates because the investment becomes more
profitable. If it has reached the critical rate, it will raise rates because the critical
rate rises. In both cases, competition for deposits increases.
Let us consider first what happens within the regimes. We put double dots on
parameters that refer to the optional IRB approach. Regime 5 does not need to be
considered here because it would imply that the large bank takes the risky project,
rendering the choice of the IRB approach unprofitable.
In regime 1, equilibrium deposit rates are
r¨L = rL +
2 (α− β1) (rk − p1 y1)
3 (1− α) (1− β1) ,
24The set of possible parameter settings is not empty: If C were negligible, all banks would
(individually) benefit from switching to the IRB approach, unless they would take the risky project
even after a switch to IRB. Now because of the assumed structure of competition, if we set σ ∼
1/n, the large bank’s profits are independent of n, whereas the small banks’ profits are inversely
proportional to n. Therefore, for each C (and other parameters of the model), we must only
choose n large enough to render the IRB approach unprofitable for small banks. Only for very
high competition (large σ), no bank takes the IRB approach even for vanishing C. All banks will
take the risky project anyway, so they would hurt themselves by opting for the IRB approach.
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r¨S = rS +
(α− β1) (rk − p1 y1)
3 (1− α) (1− β1) ,
yielding deposit volumes of
d¨L = dL +
nσ
3
(α− β1) (rk − p1 y1)
3 (1− α) (1− β1) ,
d¨S = dS − σ
3
(α− β1) (rk − p1 y1)
3 (1− α) (1− β1) .
Hence in regime 1, deposit rates of all banks rise. The large bank raises its rate
because investment becomes more profitable, and the small banks raise their rates
in reaction to the large bank. However, the rate increase of the large bank is much
larger. As a result, the large bank increases its market share at the expense of the
small banks. The large bank’s profits increase, those of the small banks decrease.
In regime 2, small banks have reached the critical rate. Because rcrit is independent
of competition, we have rS = r
crit, as defined in (5). The switch to the IRB approach
induces the large bank to increase its deposit rate. Because the rates of small banks
are constrained, small banks shrink, and the large bank grows. Profits of small
banks decrease, whereas those of the large bank increase.
In regime 3, deposit rates were rS = rL = r
crit, as defined in (5), when all banks were
using the standardized approach. Now rL rises to r˙
crit. As a result, the large bank
increases its market share, whereas small banks loose some market share. Again the
profits of the small banks decrease, whereas those of the large bank increase.
In regime 4, the large bank’s deposit rate rises to r˙crit. The rates of the small banks
are like those in (9), replacing rcrit by r˙crit. Hence, the deposit rates of all banks
rise. However, the large bank’s rate rises more, increasing the large bank’s market
share. As before, the profits of the large bank increase, those of small banks drop.
The discussion has shown that, within each regime, the small banks undergo a
reduction in volumes and profits if the large bank switches from the standardized
to the IRB approach. In contrast, the large bank benefits from the right to choose
between regulatory approaches. We now consider the effects of regime changes when
the large bank switches to the IRB approach. This is particularly problematic if
small banks switch to the risky project, i. e., the regime switches from 3 to 4. Such a
regime switch would increase aggregate risk in the economy, and market rates would
jump up.25 The following proposition shows that the transition to an optional IRB
approach may indeed lead to a switch from a regime without risk-taking (regimes 1,
2, or 3) to one with risk-taking (regime 4).
25It is not possible that the regime switches to 5, i. e., that the large bank also takes the risky
project in reaction to the jump in deposit rates. The large bank would anticipate this, and as a
consequence, not opt for the IRB approach in the first place.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium Deposit Rates and Regime Switches, Right to Choose
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Curves are as in Figure 5. The important difference is that the thick line in the right panel falls
monotonically if banks are allowed to choose between the approaches. The area of regime 5 is
plotted in gray because it cannot occur here. Again, the dotted horizontal line in the right panel
refers to the parameter constellation of the left panel, ∆β = 1/10.
Proposition 3 (Optional IRB approach) Given that only the large bank
switches to the IRB approach, a transition from the standardized to an optional IRB
approach decreases the critical level of competition σcritS , above which small banks
choose the risky project, i. e., ∂σcritS /∂∆β < 0.
Hence, rather than deterring banks from risk-taking, the optional IRB approach may
lead the small banks to engage in more risk-taking. The reason is that, under the
optional IRB approach, only the large bank benefits from lower capital requirements,
and hence marginal costs. This induces the large bank to expand and increase
deposit rates, putting the small banks under competitive pressure. In reaction, the
small banks may raise deposit rates to regain part of their customer base, and take
the risky project. This translates into an increase in aggregate risk in the economy,
given that the large bank always chooses the safe project. If we assume that the
regulator set α optimally for the standardized approach, the right to choose will
always induce small banks to increase risk-taking: An optimal α implies that the
economy is at the border between regimes 3 and 4; the right to choose then moves
the economy into regime 4.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 6. The left panel displays equilibrium deposit
rates if there is a right to choose between the two approaches. We see that the border
between regimes 3 and 4 actually moves towards lower competition, compared to
the standardized approach. As a result, risk-taking is increased by the regulation.
At the former border between regimes 3 and 4, the small banks now strictly prefer
to increase rates. The same result can be found in the right panel. In contrast
to Figure 5, the curve separating the regimes with and without risk-taking falls
monotonically. Hence, if banks are allowed to choose between the two approaches
and if only the large bank switches to the IRB approach, a more pronounced IRB
approach enlarges the set of parameters σ for which (small) banks take excessive
risks. Again, an analogous version of Remark 1 applies.
Even if the regime switches to regime 4, the small banks are bound to suffer. For the
purpose of illustration, assume that the banks are at the border between regimes 3
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and 4 before the introduction of the optional IRB approach. Then an infinitesimal
increase in ∆β has two effects: First, it induces the small banks to increase deposit
rates discretely, which leaves their profits unchanged at the margin. Second, it
increases the large bank’s deposit rate, which unambiguously hurts the small banks.
Therefore, the small banks’ profits will fall even when there are regime switches.
Interestingly, even the large bank may suffer in the event of a regime switch. This
result is surprising at first sight, given that the large bank should only choose the
IRB approach if it is beneficial. However, in choosing the approach, the large bank
takes the small banks’ interest rates as given. Hence, the possible transition from
regime 3 to regime 4 does not enter the large bank’s considerations. Starting from
the border between regimes 3 and 4, an infinitesimal increase in ∆β has two effects:
First, the large bank raises its rate by an infinitesimal amount due to the increase
in the critical rate; second, the small banks raise their rates discretely because they
want to increase their market shares. An increase in the small banks’ market shares
implies a decrease in the large bank’s profits. Hence, the large bank’s profits may
actually fall after the transition from the standardized to the optional IRB approach.
In all other cases, the large bank will always benefit from a transition from the stan-
dardized to the optional IRB approach. This yields a political economy rationale,
explaining why certain interest groups may lobby the regulatory authorities for a
highly sophisticated IRB approach. The more sophisticated the approach, the higher
the fixed costs, and the less smaller banks will be willing to adopt the new approach.
The potential benefits from the IRB approach for the large bank are largest when
only a small number of banks switch to the new approach. The small banks, whose
interests are less well organized, suffer from the introduction of the IRB approach
because its use is only optional. However, given the degree of sophistication of the
IRB approach, an adoption by all banks is not feasible.
In summary, we have shown that introducing an optional IRB approach may induce
the small banks to take higher risks, which brings about an increase in aggregate
risk, compared to the standardized approach. Therefore, the regulation does not
achieve its goal of deterring banks from risk-taking. The right to choose destroys
the advantages of the IRB approach.
6 Conclusion
Our paper has presented a novel channel through which the New Basel Capital Ac-
cord may harm small banks and lead to an increase in the aggregate risk in the
economy. We started from the observation that the new accord implicitly treats
small and large banks asymmetrically: Due to the high fixed costs from implemen-
tation, it is very likely that only large banks will opt for the IRB approach. Then
small banks will not benefit from the lower capital requirements for safe loans. This
distorts competition, benefiting the larger banks, whose capital requirements, and
hence marginal costs, are reduced when adopting the IRB approach. Large banks
increase deposit rates to attract more deposits and exploit the higher profitability
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of investments. Fiercer competition for deposits induces the small banks to raise
their deposit rates as well, in order to recapture some of their market shares. At
this higher rate, small banks may prefer a risky investment strategy over a safe one.
Starting from a situation where all banks choose a safe investment strategy, this im-
plies an increase in aggregate risk. Hence, the new accord may actually destabilize
the banking system, contrary to the regulators’ intention.
Our results do not follow from the introduction of the IRB approach as such, but
rather from the implicit asymmetric treatment of banks due to the right to choose
between the standardized and the IRB approaches. If the IRB approach is applied
uniformly across banks, banking stability is improved as intended. Small banks may
even profit from the introduction of the IRB approach.
Our model relies on three important ingredients to obtain these results: the existence
of a moral hazard problem regarding the banks’ risk choices, imperfect competition
among banks, and equity that is more expensive than other sources of refinancing.
In contrast, the details of the market structure are not crucial for our results. For
example, one may consider a banking system with several large banks competing
with each other. This would weaken the competitive position of the large bank, but
would leave the general structure of the model unchanged. As long as the large banks
are larger than the small banks, there will be a range of fixed costs C, for which only
large banks implement the IRB approach. Marginal costs of lending decrease for
large banks, and small banks suffer because of fiercer competition, which may lead
them to switch to the risky project. Similarly, one could allow for competition among
the small banks. This would complicate the analysis because all banks would have
to be analyzed simultaneously. But the decrease in marginal costs at the large bank
would still increase competition for deposits at the small banks, and would push
them to assume higher risks. Furthermore, we have modelled competition among
banks as price competition a` la Hotelling (1929). Different types of competition,
such as competition in capacities a` la Cournot, would not alter our results, as long
as the banks suffer from the lower marginal costs of their competitors.
Another simplifying assumption is that aggregate deposits are perfectly inelastic.
Generally, the aggregate supply of deposits depends on deposit rates. Again, our
main results remain valid under this alternative assumption. In particular, the
qualitative results regarding the risk-taking of banks are not affected. However, the
effects of competition and regulation on profits and welfare would be slightly different
because increases in deposit rates could lead to an aggregate increase in aggregate
deposits. This would weaken the negative externality from interest rate increases on
the competitor banks. Also, the volume expansion would tend to increase welfare,
especially if the aggregate deposit supply was very elastic.
Let us now discuss the assumptions that may be more critical. We assumed that
banks’ risk choices are dichotomous, i. e., banks can choose between two projects.
Given that the large bank’s risk-taking cannot change for the better, an increase in
risk by the small banks always translates into an increase in aggregate risk. The
same can happen with continuous risk choices. But there, the introduction of an
optional IRB approach may also change all banks’ risk-taking continuously, leading
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to higher risk at the small banks and lower risk at the large bank. Hence, the effect
on aggregate risk is ambiguous. Even in such a model, there will be parameter
constellations for which aggregate risk-taking increases. In any case, it is alarming
that the new capital regulation may lead to the opposite of what is intended.
Another assumption concerns the modelling of bank competition. We assumed
that large and small banks compete only in the deposit market, but not in the loan
market. We have argued above that, due to the fact that banks specialize in different
types of loans, this is a good approximation of real-world competition between large
and small banks. In fact, our main results still hold in the presence of loan market
competition if the banks themselves are subject to a risk-shifting problem, as in our
paper. In contrast, a model where only the banks’ borrowers are subject to a moral
hazard problem (as in Boyd and De Nicolo´ (2005)) is inconsistent with the basic
mechanism of our model. There, an increase in the capital requirement increases
the borrowers’ risk-taking due to higher loan rates. Therefore, such a setting is not
a useful benchmark for the analysis of capital regulation.
Moreover, the prompt effects of changes in capital regulation on risk-taking are due
to the binding capital requirements in our model. In practice, banks tend to hold
more than the required capital. If these additional capital buffers remain constant
after the change in the capital regulation, the analysis is unchanged. However, as
has been argued by Jokivuolle and Peura (2001), the IRB approach tends to increase
the volatility of capital requirements, which may induce banks to raise their buffers
after switching to the IRB approach. Then the benefits from the IRB approach
would diminish, and so would the competitive distortions. But it is also conceivable
that the capital buffers decrease because the banks have more control over how much
capital they actually need. Then the effects from our model may even be reinforced.
In reality, banks may react to the new regulation in a number of ways that are not
captured by our model. One possibility is bank mergers. The new regulation clearly
sets incentives for bank mergers, especially among small banks or between large
and small banks. In our model, the merged bank would take the safe project and
economize on capital. This would constitute a welfare improvement. But a merger
also raises transportation costs and thereby decreases welfare, at least if one of the
local branches is closed. Outside of our model, there are a number of additional con-
siderations that make this perspective less desirable. Most importantly, the merged
banks may become “too big to fail,” which would raise new incentive problems (see
Hakenes and Schnabel (2004) for a recent theoretical treatment). Moreover, mergers
may reduce competition. So far, empirical work on the U. S. economy has not been
able to find any indications that acquisition activity will increase significantly after
the introduction of Basel II (see Hannan and Pilloff (2004)).
Alternatively, the small banks may react to the new regulation by cooperating with
other banks in their risk management (e. g., by establishing joint rating systems)
in order to save on fixed costs. Similarly, the small banks may delegate their risk
management to a third party; however, this could give rise to new incentive prob-
lems. In both cases, small banks could operate independently, but still benefit from
economies of scale. In the context of our model, this would constitute a clear welfare
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improvement, and it would circumvent many of the disadvantages of bank mergers.
However, such solutions will only be possible if the regulators are willing to support
cooperation among the small banks, for example, by accepting or even promoting
data pooling initiatives. This would allow smaller banks to overcome the problem
of deficient historical data. Furthermore, legal restrictions (stemming, for example,
from bank secrecy laws) could prevent banks from exchanging sensitive information
about their customers with other banks or intermediaries.
Our results have important implications for the provision of loans to SMEs after
the implementation of the new accord. If small firms borrow from small banks, our
model predicts not only a decrease in bank lending to SMEs, but also a shift to SMEs
with riskier projects. Hence, the SMEs with the most efficient projects are bound
to loose the most. This effect may be mitigated by the fact that the IRB approach
gives preferential treatment to SME loans; this may induce some of the safer SMEs
to switch to larger banks. However, the large banks may not be prepared to extend
loans based primarily on soft information. In addition, the disparate treatment of
small and large banks may raise fairness concerns.
In principle, the adverse effects of the new Basel Accord described in this paper can
be mitigated in three ways: first, by lowering the fixed costs of implementing the IRB
approach; second, by subsidizing the small banks to enable them to adopt the IRB
approach; and third, by enabling smaller banks to exploit the existing economies of
scale through cooperation or the use of intermediaries. It may be difficult to lower
fixed costs without changing the accord, and without compromising the reliability
of the banks’ rating systems. A subsidization through public funds is unlikely.
However, the fact that the IRB approach sets lower capital requirements for good
projects may be seen as an implicit subsidy, aimed to induce banks to adopt the
approach. But we suspect that this subsidy may not make a switch profitable for
smaller banks. The third solution seems to be easiest to implement. It only requires
that the legal foundations for the pooling and exchanging of internal bank data be
laid. It remains to be seen whether such a proposal will be able to gain political
support. We argued above that the new accord may itself be seen as a manifestation
of regulatory capture by the large banks, who appear to be the beneficiaries of the
new regulation. They may not give up their privileges easily.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We consider the border between regions 1 ∪ 2 ∪ 3 and
4 ∪ 5 (the proof for the border between regimes 4 and 5 proceeds analogously). At
the border, σ = σcritS and small banks are just indifferent between the safe project
(and the critical rate rcrit) and the risky project (and a rate above rcrit). The large
bank’s interest rate is rcrit in both cases. Expected profits of small banks are
ΠReg. 3S =
(DS
n
+ σ (rcrit − rcrit)
)(p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
)
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=
DS
n
(p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
)
,
ΠReg. 4S =
(DS
n
+ σ (rS − rcrit)
)(p1 y1 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
)
=
1
4σ
(
DS
n
+ σ
[p2 y2 − α rk
1− α − r
crit
])2
.
The function σcritS (α) is defined by Π
Reg. 3
S = Π
Reg. 4
S . Solving for σ, we get
σcritS =
(p1 − p2) (1− α)DS/n(√
A−√B)2 , with
A = (p1 − p2) (p1 y1 − p2 y2), and
B = p1 p2 (y2 − y1)− (p1 − p2)α rk.
Clearly, σcritS is always nonnegative, and it goes to infinity if A = B, hence if
α = α∞ :=
p21 y1 − 2 p1 p2 y2 + p22 y2
(p2 − p1) rk .
For larger α, the algebraical solution is economically meaningless. This can be seen
from Figure 4, where the thick curve is the inverse of σcritS as a function of α. As
α → α∞, the curve goes to infinity. If the thick curve reappeared in the plot from
the right, the curve would have to cross the borders between regimes 1, 2 and 3,
which does not make sense economically.
Hence the proof is complete if we can show that the slope of σcritS does not change
its sign between zero and the pole. One can show that the derivative of σcritS with
respect to α is never equal to zero. Consequently, σcritS rises monotonously in α,
until it reaches the pole at α∞. 
Proof of Remark 1: Proposition 1 refers only to the parameter σ. The remark
implies that a similar statement applies to all other parameters. Only for σ ≤ σcritS do
all banks take the safe project. Therefore, the monotonic increase in σcritS (α) means
that the set of σ’s where all banks take the safe project grows for rising α, given
the other parameters. More formally, let P summarize all exogenous parameters
except σ and α, and let S denote the set of parameters where all banks take the
safe project in equilibrium. Then Proposition 1 implies that
(α1,P, σ) ∈ S =⇒ (α2,P, σ) ∈ S for α2 > α1.
This statement is symmetric with respect to all exogenous parameters. Therefore,
one can state more generally that an increase in α weakly reduces the set of (all) pa-
rameters for which at least one type of bank chooses the risky project. An analogous
argument holds for Propositions 2 and 3. 
Proof of Proposition 2: An increase in ∆β can be due to either a decrease
in β1 or an increase in β2, or both. Hence, to show that dσ
crit
S /d∆β > 0, it is
sufficient to show that dσcritS /dβ1 < 0 and dσ
crit
S /dβ2 > 0. We present the proof for
dσcritS /dβ2 > 0; that for dσ
crit
S /dβ1 < 0 is analogous.
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The switch between regimes 3 and 4 is again defined by the indifference of small
banks between safe and risky projects (the proof for the borders between regimes 4
and 5 proceeds analogously), hence
ΠReg. 3S =
DS
n
(p1 y1 − β1 rk
1− β1 − r˙
crit
)
− C !=
ΠReg. 4S =
1
4σcritS
(DS
n
+ σcritS
(p2 y2 − β2 rk
1− β2 − r˙
crit
))2 − C.
This equality defines an implicit relation σcritS (β2). Because σ
crit
S also depends on
r˙crit, which in turn depends on β2, one can write
dσcritS
dβ2
=
∂σcritS
∂β2
+
∂σcritS
∂r˙crit
∂r˙crit
∂β2
.
As stated in the main text, ∂r˙crit/∂β2 > 0. Therefore, it remains to be shown that
∂σcritS /∂β2 > 0 (a rise in β2 leads to a rise in σ
crit
S if r˙
crit is held constant) and
∂σcritS /∂r˙
crit > 0 (a rise in r˙crit leads to a rise in σcritS if β2 is kept constant).
We first show that ∂σcritS /∂β2 > 0, treating r˙
crit as a constant. The implicit function
theorem yields
∂σcritS
∂β2
= − ∂Π
Reg. 3
S /∂β2 − ∂ΠReg. 4S /∂β2
∂ΠReg. 3S /∂σ
crit
S − ∂ΠReg. 4S /∂σcritS
= − ∂Π
Reg. 4
S /∂β2
∂ΠReg. 4S /∂σ
crit
S
.
ΠReg. 4S decreases in β2 because Π
Reg. 4
S rises in Φ :=
p2 y2−β2 rk
1−β2 − r˙crit, which in turn
decreases in β2 (because rk > p2 y2). Furthermore, Π
Reg. 4
S increases in σ
crit
S (because
it increases in σ, for constant r˙crit). Otherwise, it could not have been optimal for
the small banks to choose r˙crit for σ below σcritS . This proves that ∂σ
crit
S /∂β2 > 0.
Now we show that ∂σcritS /∂r˙
crit > 0. Using again the implicit function theorem,
∂σcritS
∂r˙crit
= − ∂Π
Reg. 3
S /∂r˙
crit − ∂ΠReg. 4S /∂r˙crit
∂ΠReg. 3S /∂σ
crit
S − ∂ΠReg. 4S /∂σcritS
=
∂ΠReg. 3S /∂r˙
crit − ∂ΠReg. 4S /∂r˙crit
∂ΠReg. 4S /∂σ
crit
S
.
∂ΠReg. 3S /∂r˙
crit = −DS/n and ∂ΠReg. 4S /∂r˙crit = −(DS/n+ΦσcritS )/2 with Φ as defined
above; hence ∂ΠReg. 3S /∂r˙
crit − ∂ΠReg. 4S /∂r˙crit = −(DS/n− ΦσcritS )/2. Furthermore,
∂ΠReg. 4S /∂σ
crit
S =
Φ
2σcritS
(DS
n
+ ΦσcritS
)
− 1
4σcritS
2
(DS
n
+ ΦσcritS
)2
.
This term is equal to zero for Φ = DS
nσcritS
(the other zero is for negative Φ). For
smaller Φ, the term is negative; for larger Φ, it is positive. For smaller Φ, the term
∂ΠReg. 3S /∂r˙
crit − ∂ΠReg. 4S /∂r˙crit from above is also negative, and vice versa. As a
result, the numerator and denominator of ∂σcritS /∂r˙
crit always have the same signs.
This proves that ∂σcritS /∂r˙
crit > 0, and completes the proof of the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 3: For the proof, we build on the intuition delivered by
Figure 7. Black curves denote the reaction functions of small and large banks under
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Figure 7: Reaction Functions Near the Critical α
rS
rL
Thin lines are reaction functions by small banks; thick lines those of large banks. Black lines
denote the standardized approach; gray lines the IRB approach. Under the chosen parameter
constellation, the kinks occur for negative deposit rates.
the old regulatory framework, i. e., all banks use the standardized approach. Assume
that α is set in a such way that the equilibrium is close to the border between regimes
3 and 4. In other words, in equilibrium, small banks are individually indifferent
between the critical deposit rate rcrit and a higher rate (which would signal the risky
project). We want to argue that an increase in ∆β then leads to a switch to regime
4. In Figure 7, the equilibrium is given by the white dot to the left. Here, indeed,
the equilibrium rL is low enough to ensure that small banks offer r
crit and take the
safe project. Also, the large bank offers rcrit. However, it has some “reserves”: Even
if small banks raised deposit rates, the large bank would not react by raising rates,
too (in the figure, the reaction function of the large bank “oversteps” the critical
point).
We assumed that a switch to the IRB approach is profitable only for the large bank.
As a result, the large bank implements the IRB approach, and the critical deposit
rate for the large bank rises from rcrit to r˙crit. The large bank raises deposit rates.
Consequently, small banks now prefer to offer a higher deposit rate (and thus to
signal the risky project). Before the IRB approach was introduced, all banks took
the safe project; now all small banks take the risky project. The aggregate deposit
volume remains unchanged, hence aggregate risk in the economy has increased.
There are two reasons why small banks may be indifferent between rcrit and a higher
rate, but the situation may still be different from that in Figure 7. First, small and
large banks may be so asymmetric that, at the point at which small banks are
indifferent, the large bank offers a rate below rcrit (regime 2). Taking the derivative
of (7) with respect to α, one proves that, for given rS, deposit rates of the large bank
rise if regulation for large banks softens. As before, this induces the small banks to
raise rates and pick the risky project.
Second, banks may be so symmetric, and the IRB approach so close to the standard-
ized approach (β1 ≈ α ≈ β2), that introducing the IRB approach at the large bank,
and the ensuing upward swing in market rates will also induce the large bank to
take the risky project. This, as already discussed, leads to a contradiction, because
large banks would not have implemented the IRB approach in the first place.
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Up to now, we have considered only marginal increases in ∆β. We now look at a
discrete transition from the standardized to the IRB approach. The standardized
approach has ∆β = 0, the IRB approach has ∆β > 0. This can be thought of as a
continuous series of marginal increases in ∆β. Then if the equilibrium is originally
in regimes 1, 2 or 3, it can either stay in these regimes, switch among them (which
does not alter aggregate risk-taking), or switch to regime 4 (regime 5 is not possible
under the optional IRB approach). Above, in this proof, we have shown that the
opposite, a switch from 4 to 3 (and possibly further to 2 or 1), cannot occur in
reaction to an increase in ∆β. Hence, indeed, the range of σ under which the risky
project is chosen is extended. 
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